Less munitions, more problems
August 7, 2026
Salam reader,
Last weekend, reports emerged that a joint United States and Israeli operation intended to strike energy infrastructure targets in Iran was being considered—something President Donald Trump had threatened in recent weeks. On July 31, there were high-level US discussions about cutting electricity across Tehran, but no decision had been made that afternoon (CBS News). Americans had also been advised to leave the Middle East, which suggested an attack was imminent (X).
One of the Iranians in Tehran I spoke with couldn’t understand why the United States and Israel would want to target the country’s energy infrastructure instead of its leadership. “We’ll fall behind 30–40 years,” they told me, if the capital’s electricity is struck. (X) The logic seems to be that cutting Tehran’s electricity—which is collective punishment and is considered a war crime—would cause Iranians to rise up and pressure the Islamic Republic into making a deal, assuming they survive the uprising.
But numerous calls were made by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi to regional leaders—his counterparts in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, as well as Pakistan’s army chief—warning that Tehran would hit Persian Gulf Arab states’ oil, power, and water plants unless they convinced the United States to end strikes on Iran and seek a diplomatic resolution to the war (Reuters). Then, on August 1, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman spoke with President Trump, who expressed concerns about such an escalation (Axios). On the same date, Trump posted on Truth Social:
“The USA is locked and loaded and ready to go against the Islamic Republic of Iran, at levels of Military Terror, Strength, and Power not seen since World War II. Despite this, we have just been asked by Iran, and other Middle Eastern Countries, to hold off any attack in that the perimeters of a deal has been agreed to. This would include the Immediate, Complete, and Total OPENING OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT…” (X)
It was reportedly through this social media post that Israeli officials learned the strikes had been called off (Times of Israel). Apparently, US Central Command (CENTCOM) wasn’t aware either.
The following day, Trump said he would give diplomacy another chance. Then, on August 4, the US president said that “a lot of progress has been made.” Now, it appears that Iran and Oman are nearing an agreement to manage traffic through the Strait of Hormuz (Washington Post). According to Tehran, incoming ships would enter through Iranian territorial waters, while outgoing ships would exit through Omani waters—meaning the arrangement would formalize Tehran’s control of the strategic waterway (Washington Post). It remains unclear whether the Trump administration would accept that.
Meanwhile, on August 7, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed a mutual defense pact known as the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, which “stipulates that any armed attack against any one of the three states shall be regarded as an attack against them all.” (New York Times) The text isn’t public, and the extent of the obligations remains unclear.
The agreement comes as “multiple intelligence reports” from Saudi Arabia, the United States, and regional countries suggest that the Kingdom is reportedly bracing for “multiple coordinated attacks” by Shia militias in Iraq and Houthi rebels in Yemen “in the very near future” under the guidance of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (CNN).
Ebrahim Rezaei, a member of the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, wrote on X:
“The Saudis should understand that a paper agreement with Turkey and Pakistan will not bring them security, just as decades of one-sided dependence on the Americans failed to do so. Change your policies so you don’t have to beg others for security.” (X)
Last week, I wrote about how part of the logic behind not further escalating with Tehran may have been due, in part, to the fact that the United States is running low on air defense interceptors. It turns out that the situation is worse than previously understood.
Journalist Spencer Ackerman breaks down the numbers from a recent Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report:
“According to CSIS, the US had 2330 Patriot (smaller, short-range) interceptors and 452 THAAD (larger, long-range) interceptors at the start of the war. Five months later, it has between 759 and 827 Patriot interceptors and between 234 and 278 THAADs. Those aren’t figures for the interceptors the US has in the Middle East. They’re the figures for all the interceptors the US has, period. In other words, the US has so far used up around 66 percent of its Patriot stocks and around 40 percent, conservatively, of its THAADs. It did that in five months across a war it chose. A war that Trump said would be won in four to five weeks.” (Forever Wars)
An anonymous defense official told The Atlantic that “the problem would be mitigated ‘if we knew when the war will end… The real problem is that there is no long-term strategy—and we can’t plan around that.’”
True to form, President Trump knew this was a potential problem. He had been briefed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine and other senior aides before the war that a conflict with Iran could significantly drain the US munitions stockpile (Wall Street Journal).
But rather than look inward, the US president shared his frustration over the Iran war last week at Camp David, where he demanded answers from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over why he had apparently been misled about severe munitions shortages (Washington Post). Trump reportedly believed the interceptor issue “had been fixed,” despite the Pentagon having sought additional $18.2 billion from Congress for replacements. The administration is now engaged in damage control after the US president ordered new investigations into disclosures about the Pentagon’s air-defense interceptors and offensive missile stockpiles (Wall Street Journal).
Another sign that there is no coherent strategy is that CENTCOM sent a message to a broad group of military analysts asking “for new creative and unconventional ways to pressure and punish Iran.” (CNN)
Tehran reads these tea leaves closely and will likely continue to hunker down on its current approach, having studied how previous US conflicts in Vietnam and Afghanistan unfolded. Iranian officials calculate that if they can hold their ground long enough, Washington may eventually lose patience and withdraw from the war or offer them a more palatable deal.
Interestingly, the Wall Street Journal reports:
“Iran’s negotiators are speaking more frankly about the limits of their ability to shape the outcome of talks and have said they are under heavy pressure to deliver immediate financial benefits from their deals… [The IRGC] is winning praise internally for attacks that have kept the US off balance and could again ramp up its strikes on ships if a deal isn’t lucrative enough…”
It’s not surprising that internal dynamics within the Islamic Republic are complicating talks, as political factions have historically engaged in their own infighting—not unlike the divisions between Democrats and Republicans in the United States. That said, one can always count on Iranian officials to somehow make matters more difficult for themselves.
Academic Mehrzad Boroujerdi, whose father’s assassination was overseen by some of the key military-security figures who now rule Tehran, understands this dynamic well. He wrote in The New York Times:
“Like everyone else, I don’t know how this war is going to end. But after a lifetime of observing these men, I do know this: Expecting meekness or diplomatic finesse from them is a dangerous illusion. Their combustible mix of vanity and mendacity has trapped Iran in debilitating crises, both at home and abroad. The accumulation of economic, social and environmental failures has left the country increasingly vulnerable and made governance ever more costly. Yet the regime endures… That is the paradox of Iran today—a system under relentless strain yet still far from collapse.”
More soon,
Holly
P.S. Feel free to follow me on X for real-time updates and on LinkedIn, where I’ve been sharing additional interviews and commentary.