Game of Turbans—or Berets?
August 14, 2026
NOTE: I’m taking a couple of weeks off to recharge.
Salam reader,
An unexpected shake-up took place at the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on August 9, when Brigadier General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr resigned as secretary, just less than five months into the role (New York Times). His predecessor, Ali Larijani, was killed during the war. The SNSC’s membership includes the president, who chairs the council; the speaker of parliament; the head of the judiciary; the foreign, interior, and intelligence ministers; the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff; the commanders of the Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the official responsible for planning and budget affairs; and two representatives appointed by the Supreme Leader.
Zolqadr—close to Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the key figures in the negotiations—was replaced by Mohsen Rezaei, an adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and former commander of the IRGC during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War until 1997 (Al Jazeera). Rezaei has run for president of Iran several times and has become the butt of jokes among some Iranians. He was also one of the voices who opposed the memorandum of understanding signed with the United States in June. The move by Khamenei may have been an attempt to rein in Speaker Qalibaf’s growing influence, and as hardline voices have intensified their opposition to any diplomatic deal with the United States (Amwaj.media).
Interestingly, hardline cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi—a relative of the Khamenei family by marriage and Secretary General of Hezbollah in Iran—said in videotaped remarks a week earlier that such an appointment was underway and was intended to check President Masoud Pezeshkian’s government, which has faced intense attacks from the hardline faction over the negotiations (New York Times). According to Kharrazi, Pezeshkian had threatened to resign nearly 30 times since taking office, and the Supreme Leader reportedly warned that if he did so again, he would accept his resignation (IranWire). Kharrazi also said that Khamenei told Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi that “under no circumstances does he have the right to interfere in the negotiations anymore.” Pezeshkian later issued a televised rebuttal, insisting that his relationship with Khamenei remained fine, although he acknowledged that reaching the Supreme Leader was difficult.
Following Kharrazi’s remarks, the Supreme Leader’s office called them false (Iran International). The Special Clerical Court also summoned him.
Another significant move was also made: Hossein Taeb, the former head of the IRGC intelligence arm and an ally of Khamenei, was named commander of the Basij, the paramilitary force known for repressing protests. Taeb is best known for leading the organization during the crackdown on the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement (Wall Street Journal).
Five other military positions were also officially filled. Supreme Leader Khamenei appointed Major General Ali Abdullahi as chief of staff of the Armed Forces and Brigadier General Kiyomars Heydari as deputy chief of staff (Tasnim News Agency). Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi was promoted to major general and appointed commander of the IRGC, while Major General Mustafa Izadi was named acting commander. Rear Admiral Ali Ozmaei was appointed commander of the IRGC Navy.
(It’s worth noting that Rezaei and Vahidi have been subject to Interpol Red Notices over the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 85 people.)
The reshuffle suggests that the Islamic Republic is increasingly turning to individuals with military and intelligence backgrounds as it seeks to consolidate power and make Tehran more security-dominated, thereby reinforcing hardline positions. Taeb’s appointment is especially noteworthy given his experience suppressing dissent, and it presumably reflects concerns about another uprising as Iran’s economic situation continues to deteriorate and the Islamic Republic remains deeply unpopular with the majority of the public.
This week, the Statistical Center of Iran released its latest data showing that food prices increased by 128 percent in the Iranian calendar month of Tir (June 21–July 20) compared with the same period last year (Al Jazeera). Iranians have complained about constant price changes when they shop, and this has become one of the most common refrains in discussions of the economy.
Maziar, a 45-year-old in Tehran, said:
“We have given up buying red meat, the desirable Iranian rice, and the high-quality oils that used to be a staple on our table. As soon as I receive my salary, I rush to buy household necessities, especially food items, for fear that their prices will rise tomorrow. It might sound like a funny joke, but unfortunately, it is a bitter tragedy.” (Al Jazeera)
Mahmoud, a 63-year-old grocery store owner, said:
“Prices change every day, and whenever I open the shop in the morning, I find that the wholesale price has risen compared to the past few days. Customers, most of whom are wealthy, now come just to ask about prices, whereas in past years they used to buy regardless of the cost… I have been a merchant for over 40 years, and I have never seen conditions like these. Even during the years of the Iran-Iraq War [1980-1988], the markets maintained a minimum level of daily purchasing activity, but today the market has reached a state of clinical death.” (Al Jazeera)
The shopkeeper noted that some Iranians now ask whether they can buy goods on credit, which is nearly impossible for merchants because prices are constantly changing.
An analyst claimed that the war could ultimately destroy 2 million to 3 million jobs (Wall Street Journal). State media reported that an average family of four is now spending around 70 percent of their income on basic food items (RFERL).
While the Islamic Republic has absorbed enormous costs, its economic problems continue to deepen. As Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty notes:
“Iranian oil imports have ground to a halt. Authorities are rationing fuel and electricity as well as restricting access to foreign currency. Overall inflation will reach nearly 69 percent this year, the highest since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the International Monetary Fund forecasts.”
President Donald Trump appears to be thinking along similar lines. He told Axios on August 9, “We are only semi-negotiating with them. We are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money.” The president said Tehran “is in very bad shape” economically and has no money to pay its armed forces, adding that the US naval blockade has exacerbated the country’s economic crisis.
The Trump administration appears poised to intensify that economic pressure. On August 13, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the United States would soon impose measures on Iran “like have never been seen in the history of economic isolation on a country,” and that additional announcements were expected the following week.
“Watch this space for more announcements coming next week because we are going to apply measures like have never been seen in the history of economic isolation on a country.” (Reuters)
That suggests Washington is betting that Tehran’s deteriorating economic situation can create leverage as diplomatic efforts remain stalled. Time will tell whether this strategy works, but it’s clear that those suffering most from external and internal pressure are the Iranian people.
More soon,
Holly
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